The computation of initiating event frequencies has received much attention in recent years. This attention reflects the importance of support system failures in the computation of core damage frequencies from internal events for nuclear power plants. Multi-train support system failures, such as a total loss of service water or a total loss of component cooling water, potentially represent significant impacts for many nuclear plant designs. The contribution to basic event importance from such initiator models has also been recognized, especially as part of the Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI) program; Reference 1.
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The q(t)'s are the component unavailabilities and the w j (t)'s are the component occurrence rates per year. The contribution from each of the components failing in the time interval 't' to 't+Δt' is summed over the n i components in the cutset to obtain the total occurrence rate per year from minimal cutset 'i'. The contribution from the entire system is then obtained by summing over the entire set of minimal cutsets.
As noted in Reference 2, the above formulation is only applicable when all the components have a per hour failure rate (the λ model). For demand failures, the number of demands per unit time may be accounted for in the expressions for both q ni (t) and w i (t). Alternatively, for minimal cutsets involving demand failures, the failure on demand event probabilities may be treated as multipliers on the minimal cutset occurrence rates.
In Reference 3, the time-independent fault tree approach to system initiator computation was compared against a timedependent approach that considered repair using Markov models. The conclusion was that at long times the fault tree model results closely approximated or were slightly conservative compared to the Markov model asymptotic results. Only for very short mission times when common cause failures are unimportant were the fault tree model results found to be significantly (i.e., on the order of 60%) conservative. In the time-independent approach followed, the fault tree logic was specifically structured with separate basic events for the q(t)'s and w(t)'s so that the minimal cutsets developed by Boolean reduction of the fault tree exactly matched the form of Equation XI-28 above from Reference 2. The mixing of event probabilities and event occurrence frequencies in the same fault tree logic was not fully explained. However, the fault trees were constructed to specifically avoid the combination of multiple event occurrence frequencies [i.e., two or more events representing the w(t)'s] in any one minimal cutset.
An important difference was in the interpretation of the q(t)'s and w(t)'s. Unlike the physical interpretation given in Reference 2, the authors of Reference 3 identified the w(t)'s as the first failure of the events in the cutsets and the q(t)'s as the failure of other components in the cutset subsequent to the first and prior to the restoration of the first failure. However, the formulation of the proposed equation was the same.
INTRODUCTION
It has become common practice throughout the industry for PSA analysts to model multi-train support systems using fault trees. Accepted modeling and quantification procedures for doing so, however, are not available. The following is a list of possible issues in such system initiator models and their quantification:
1. The desire to minimize the changes from the system fault trees constructed to evaluate the conditional failure probability of a system in response to some other initiator, as compared to the fault tree for the same system used to compute initiating event failure frequencies.
2. The difficulties in constructing a fault tree to account for failure combinations within the system failure occurrence fault tree when separate events are used to represent the event occurrence rate versus the component unavailability (i.e., alternate mission times) for the same component failure mode.
3. The appropriate accounting of all initial operating configurations of the system (i.e., alignments), especially how the initial alignment changes the equipment assumed to be normally operating. For example, when the normally operating pumps are rotated, multiple initial system alignments are often needed for time-averaged models.
4. The proper identification of the normally operating failure modes from the complete list of basic events appearing in the system fault tree, when not all basic events that represent failure modes to operate, involve normally operating equipment. For example, some standby pumps must first start in response to another operating equipment failure mode, and then it too may fail to operate after successfully starting.
5. The potential for excessive truncation of low probability system failure combinations during fault tree logic reduction.
6. The appropriate use of different mission times for occurrence rates and component unavailabilities for the same component failure mode; e.g., pump failures to run.
7. The need to account for the different restoration times of failed components when considering other component failures in the same system failure combination.
8. The degree to which the fault tree quantification adequately approximates the Markov model solutions which account for repair assuming constant repair rates.
9. The need to incorporate the importance of basic events leading to system failure occurrence frequencies so that their contribution to the core damage frequency can be determined.
10. The difficulty in computing and combining basic event importance measures when the same component failure mode may involve different mission times; e.g., for failures per year and for conditional failure probabilities prior to restoration of the first equipment failed.
Many of the above issues are not applicable to system initiators that involve single train systems in which all components are normally operating. The resulting single element cutsets for single train, normally operating systems are easily quantified using standard fault tree techniques by replacing the event unavailabilities by event occurrence rates as suggested in Reference 1. Similarly, support systems which involve redundancy but in which still only one train is normally operating can also be easily modeled and quantified using the same technique of replacing the event unavailabilities with event occurrence frequencies for the normally operating failure modes. In this case, occurrence frequencies are substituted for the basic events representing the normally operating train and after Boolean reduction exactly only one such occurrence frequency appears in the minimal cutsets.
The issues enumerated address the more general problem; i.e., that for a system with multiple, normally operating trains. The proposed approach which follows addresses each of the above listed issues.
APPROACH TO MODELING AND QUANTIFYING SYSTEM INITIATORS
The following steps describe the proposed approach for modeling and quantifying system initiators.
Step 1: Retain the system fault tree constructed to evaluate the conditional failure probability of the system in response to other initiators.
Many systems with multiple, normally operating system trains and whose failure may result in an initiating event are also modeled as fault trees to describe the ways in which such systems may fail in response to other initiators. Examples of such system fault trees are for service water, component cooling water, and for ventilation systems. It is desirable to minimize future model maintenance to use the same fault trees for system initiators. The fault tree developed must be general enough to represent all potential initial system alignments. If the system fault tree includes house events or transfers representing supporting systems, we assume these supporting systems are successful for purposes of modeling the system initiator and either remove them from the fault tree or set them to success. Failures involving such supporting systems should instead be considered separately as their own unique support system initiators. We propose not to modify the system fault tree to include any new basic events to distinguish those failure modes of the same equipment with mission times for one year and for repair times (issues 1 and 2).
Step 2: Identify the changes to the fault tree needed to ensure that each initial system alignment, k, is modeled separately It is recognized that system fault trees developed in many PSA software include basic events identifying the fractions of time the system spends on average in each possible initial alignment. While common practice, it should be recognized that alignment events are unique in that they are mutually exclusive; i.e., one system cannot be in two initial alignments at the same time. Such exclusions are typically handled later during recovery analysis.
In the RISKMAN ® software, however, initial alignments are modeled differently. Since the system fault trees are quantified separately, the system fault tree can be developed generally to apply to all initial alignments but then are quantified repeatedly once for each alignment subject to the impacts representing each alignment. For example, if pumps A and B are initially running in one alignment, the changes would be to set the probabilities for failure to start of pumps A and B to zero. The fraction of time spent in each alignment is then used to weight the failure probability of each alignment. If the system fault tree has already been constructed with house event switches representing such changes, then alignment impacts may be assigned to these house events instead. Separate initial system alignments, k, may be needed to account not only for different normal operating alignments but also for periodic testing, preventative maintenance, and for corrective maintenance. For each initial system alignment, the proposed approach is to identify the changes to the basic event values, or house event states, as appropriate to represent the unique alignment impacts (issue 3). It is noted that such impacts may not always fail a system train. For example, for pump flow tests, the test alignment impacts may only introduce another potential failure mode; i.e., that of requiring closure of the test valve which if left open may divert excessive flow away from the mission.
Step 3: For each system alignment, k, list the basic events representing the failure modes of normally operating equipment; i.e., the w n,k (t) in Equation 1.
For a system failure to cause a system initiator, there must be at least one normally operating failure mode among the basic events representing system failure; i.e., standby systems do not generally cause an initiating event. The list of normally operating failure modes would generally include any basic event failure mode that involves a failure to operate. However, an exception is that failures to operate of equipment initially in standby for alignment, k, should not be included on the list of normally operating failure modes for that same alignment, k. Such failure modes involve failures to operate only after successfully starting the equipment. For such events, the mission times are determined by the restoration times; i.e., the q nk (t). These basic events should therefore not be included in the list of normally operating failure modes (issue 4).
Step 4: Use Binary Decision Diagrams (BDD) to separately quantify each system alignment of the fault tree; i.e., BDD k .
After applying the basic event and house event impacts representing each initial alignment, a unique fault tree representation of the system is thereby created for each alignment. There are alternate means to solve such fault trees. We propose the use of BDD techniques to avoid the problems associated with frequency truncation. See for example Reference 5 for a discussion of BDDs. BDD representations do not require the use of frequency truncation to achieve Boolean logic reduction of system models that have complexity similar to that of a service water or component cooling water system without the associated supporting systems (issue 5).
Step 5: Quantify the generalized system BDD once for each basic event, n, representing normally operating equipment failure modes, w n,k (t) for each alignment, k.
Note that the system BDD specialized for a given normally operating equipment failure mode, n, has to be quantified for each of the multiple alignments, k. This is appropriate since each system alignment is defined exclusive of all others. The quantification of the BDD for the alignment, k, normally operating equipment failure mode combination, w n,k (t), requires three additional changes.
• The first change to the BDD in the system alignment fault tree is for the basic event corresponding to the single normally operating equipment failure mode, n. The basic event value for selected event 'n' is to be set to 1.0; i.e., for q n,k (t) (issue 6).
• The second change is that all other basic events in the BDD for the system alignment fault tree are to be evaluated assuming a mission time equal to the restoration time of the normally operating equipment failure mode, n; i.e., t Rn . This restoration time represents the minimum mission time for the other equipment in the system failure combination (issue 7). By evaluating the BDD k conditional on the occurrence of the normally operating failure mode, the resulting (i.e., BDD n,k ) is assured to be no greater than 1.0. The BDD quantification approach automatically accounts for any overlap of the failure combinations and derives the exact conditional probability of system failure. Unlike standard fault tree quantification using minimal cutsets, no rare-event or min-cut upper bound approximations are needed (issue 8). Note also that use of BDD for quantification permits the inclusion of NOT logic in system fault trees without any loss of accuracy or increase in quantification time.
• The third change is to compute each of the w n,k using a one year mission time (issue 6); i.e., for each normally operating equipment failure mode n and for each alignment, k.
The conditional BDD quantification result for each alignment-normally operating equipment failure mode combination is then made unconditional by weighting the conditional system failure probability produced by each BDD quantification by the alignment fraction, A k , and by the normally operating failure rates per year; i.e., w n,k .
The total system initiator frequency (IE Freq.) is then obtained by summing over the contributions from all 'K'
In the above Equation 2, the different mission times for occurrence rates and component unavailabilities (issue 6) are accounted for. Also, the repair times used for component unavailabilities are specialized to the associated normally operating failure mode (issue 7).
The above approach has the potential to overlap some contributions, although for most applications, such system initiators are low enough in frequency for this overlap to be negligible. This overlap may occur because a single failure that has a yearly mission time can show up in the sum once when it is the normally operating failure mode, w n,k , and then again when computing the BDD system failure probability conditional on the occurrence of other normally operating failure modes in that same alignment. One can consider this as allowing exposure to failure for each normally operating failure mode for the entire year when in actuality each failure will contribute to plant downtime and hence less exposure for all other failure combination contributors.
One approach to eliminate this potential overlap is to scale the resulting equation by a factor which accounts for the fraction of time the plant is operating in a year, excluding all times that the plant would be down due to system failures.
A second approach is to revise the method in which the BDD is computed. To eliminate the contributions from other contributions that do not involve the normally operating failure mode, one can modify the fault tree as follows. Starting from the basic event representing the normally operating failure mode n, proceed up the tree logic excluding OR logic contributions but retaining all AND logic involving the operating failure mode. This approach would simplify the fault tree prior to BDD solution and throw out all contributions not involving the normally operating failure mode n. The drawback for this change in approach is that the BDD representing the fault tree would have to be revised for every normally operating failure mode and alignment combination.
Step 6: Compute criticality importance (i.e., CIF, essentially the same as Fussel-Vesely importance when NOT logic is not used) and risk achievement worth (RAW) measures using the BDD quantification tool (issue 9).
• The criticality importance measures of the normally operating equipment failure modes, n, evaluated for a one year mission time (CIF-w n ) to the system initiator frequency are just the fractions of the system initiator frequency totals contributed by the w n,k terms summed over all alignments, k.
for m≠n] } /(IE Freq.) (3) Note that the term w n,k doesn't always appear for all alignments; e.g., when the basic event does not represent a normally operating failure mode in a specific alignment.
• The RAW values of the normally operating equipment failure modes evaluated for a one year mission time (RAW-w n ) are obtained by computing the change in IE Freq. obtained by setting the w n,k to 1.0. Setting these occurrence rates to 1.0 for computing RAW is an assumption which we believe reasonable. Since they are frequencies, they can in fact occur multiple times per year.
• Determination of the criticality importance measures for the basic events represented within the BDD logic (i.e., those evaluated for mission times determined by the restoration times) is more involved. One problem is that the basic event values change as a function of the restoration times for the normally operating equipment failures, n. Therefore, there is no accepted definition of criticality importance for such events.
We instead define a criticality importance measure for such events which has the same property as Fussel-Vesely importance (FVI) obtained from minimal cutsets. That property is that 
• Similarly, the RAW values for q j,k (t Rn ) are obtained by evaluating the normalized change in IE Freq. when setting the q j,k (t Rn )≡1.0 when j≠n. 
Step 7: The criticality importance RAW measures for system initiator frequency may be combined with the importance of the system initiator to core damage to obtain the importance of each basic event used in the system initiator model to core damage (issue 10). These measures must then be combined with the importance measures for the associated basic events for the same system but in response to other initiators to obtain the total basic event importance measures. When combining the different results, we take advantage of the fact that when a system fails as an initiating event the resulting sequence model logic does not depend on the events modeled within that system.
CONCLUSIONS
The BDD quantification approach offers an effective way to compute system initiator frequencies and to address all of the key related issues. Moreover, the BDD logic need only be constructed once for each alignment, though it is to be evaluated many times.
The importance measures for each basic event are separated into two parts. One part represents the contribution from the normally operating failure modes evaluated for a one year mission time. The second part is for the corresponding failure modes evaluated in response to the failure of normally operating equipment. This approach has been used for many years by the PRA software RISKMAN ® to account for basic event contributions to system initiator frequencies.
